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The purpose of the current study was to examine relations among religiosity, 
moral obligation, and gratitude. Gratitude was conceptualized as a virtue and 
operationalized as connective gratitude; connective gratitude occurs when a benefactor 
freely gives a benefit to a beneficiary and the beneficiary, recognizing the good intentions 
of the benefactor, freely wishes to repay the benefactor if and when appropriate. 
Religiosity was examined on two dimensions: transcendence, defined as the extent of 
belief in God or a higher power, and interpretation, defined as the way religious content 
is processed from literal to symbolic.  
 Analysis of a religiosity measure (PCBS), an open-ended survey to assess the 
expression of gratitude, and a vignette to assess moral obligation showed that there were 
no significant associations between the interpretation dimension of religiosity and 
gratitude, but that interpretation was related to the type of moral obligation expressed. In 
addition, there were no significant relations between the transcendent dimension of 
religiosity and either gratitude as a virtue or moral obligation. However, a significant 
association was found between a different type of gratitude (measured with the GQ-6) 
and the transcendence dimension, suggesting an inconsistency between these two ways of 
defining and measuring gratitude. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Gratitude is often a focus of religious texts, prayers, and teachings.  Gratitude is a 
central tenet in Judaism, as all things are thought to come from God.  Aleinu, the 
concluding prayer, specifically thanks God for the destiny of the Jewish people (Emmons 
& Hill, 2001).  Discussions of gratitude are also ubiquitous in both classical and modern 
Christian texts.  Emmons and Hill (2001) posited that the first two commandments reflect 
two forms of gratitude: “…gratitude to our Creator and thankfulness to others 
demonstrated by our loving actions towards them” (p. 33).  Similarly, gratitude is 
inherent in two of the pillars of the Islamic faith.  During daily prayers, Muslims give 
praise and adoration to God for his gifts.  Ramadan, a month of fasting, is intended to 
inculcate gratitude: “He wants you to complete the prescribed period and glorify him that 
He has guided you, and perchance ye shall be grateful” (Koran, 2:185, as quoted in 
Emmons & Hill, 2001, p. 35).  
Social science research on relations between religiosity (i.e., a variable 
representing religious feeling or belief) and gratitude has been carried out by scholars in a 
number of different religious contexts.  However, this body of literature is relatively 
small and weakened by theoretical and methodological inconsistencies.  For example, no 
two studies have used the same definitions and measures of gratitude and religiosity.  As 
a result, generalizations about how gratitude and religiosity might relate to one another
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are highly speculative.  To address this lacuna, I utilized specific and theoretically 
grounded definitions and measures of gratitude and religiosity in this study, as well as 
adding moral obligation to potentially explain relations between gratitude and religiosity. 
These three constructs are outlined briefly below, followed by a brief discussion of the 
central questions the current study attempts to address.  
Religiosity 
 Religiosity has been examined from myriad angles in social science research, 
including religious belief, behavior, affiliation, friendship, ideology, and efficacy.  Few 
of these approaches have been immune to criticism, largely because scholars place 
differing emphasis and importance on various aspects of religiosity.  Most researchers 
have utilized an approach developed by Gordon Allport, which looks at religiosity from 
two facets: intrinsic belief and external behaviors (Wulff, 1991).  While this approach 
may approximate the degree to which a person believes in God or higher power, it does 
little to tell you how or why a person engages with religion.  The current study uses an 
alternate approach—Wulff’s schema of religious attitudes—which examines religiosity 
from two dimensions: interpretation (i.e., How do people process religious texts, imagery, 
and teachings?) and transcendence (i.e., How strongly do people believe in God or a 
higher power?).  This conceptualization of religiosity mirrors how moral obligation and 
gratitude are examined in this study, as all three approaches examine some element of 
how people think, as opposed to simply what they think.  
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Gratitude 
On November 4, 1963 President John F. Kennedy released a Thanksgiving 
Proclamation to the nation in which he wrote “As we express our gratitude, we must 
never forget that the highest appreciation is not to utter words, but to live by them” (p. 
1060).  Amid an era of political and social divisions, Kennedy encouraged citizens to 
express gratitude not only through words, but through actions that would strengthen 
families, neighborhoods, cities, states, and the nation as a whole.  The type of gratitude he 
described goes beyond a simple thank you—it requires that people respond to one 
another with thoughtful and kind reciprocal behavior.  A similar construct of gratitude is 
the focus of the current study; gratitude is conceptualized as a virtue, a midpoint between 
ingratitude and obsequious gratitude, and as a skill that can develop across the life course 
through practice (Tudge & Freitas, 2018).  As defined by Tudge and Freitas, gratitude is 
expressed to people, as opposed to for things.  Gratitude begins when a benefactor 
altruistically gives a benefit to a beneficiary.  To express gratitude to the benefactor, the 
beneficiary then “has to freely wish to repay the benefactor, if possible and when 
appropriate, with something deemed to be of value to the benefactor” (p. 4).  Based on 
the work of previous scholars, Tudge and Freitas delineated this type of gratitude as 
connective gratitude.  While connective gratitude is closest to gratitude as a virtue, Tudge 
and Freitas also described other types, including verbal and concrete gratitude.  The 
conceptualization of gratitude as a virtue is one of a myriad currently being used in social 
science research.  Other scholars have treated gratitude as an emotion, a disposition, a 
trait, or a combination of these factors.  
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Moral Obligation 
 Moral obligation was included as a third variable in this study because it helps to 
explain why people express different types of gratitude: Do people express gratitude 
because they freely wish to do so, or because an authority (e.g., a religious leader) told 
them it was the appropriate response?  Piaget’s (1932/1965) theory of moral reasoning 
was utilized to help analyze this complex dynamic.  Piaget delineated two forms of moral 
reasoning: heteronomous and autonomous.  Heteronomous moral reasoning relies upon 
rules and norms developed by authority figures, whereas autonomous moral reasoning 
relies upon rules and norms developed cooperatively with others.  To be a virtuously 
grateful person one must have developed autonomous moral obligation, because, as 
defined above, one has to “freely wish” to repay the benefactor. The ability to “freely 
wish” to do something cannot be out of duty (i.e., heteronomous obligation), but out of 
intrinsic desire (i.e., autonomous obligation).  
Central Questions 
By examining religiosity, gratitude, and moral obligation from specific and 
theoretically-grounded perspectives I hope this study may be able to address key 
questions about these constructs: Are religiosity and gratitude linked?  Are people who 
are highly religious more likely to be grateful?  Are people who think about religious 
content as a symbol for how they should live their lives more likely to be grateful?  The 
questions explored in this study can be placed into two groups, which are based on the 
two dimensions of religiosity in Wulff’s schema: interpretation and transcendence. 
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Interpretation.  The interpretation dimension of Wulff’s (1991) schema 
represents how one interprets religious content (e.g., beliefs, images, scriptures, rituals) 
from literal to symbolic.  Based on theory and the existing literature (each discussed at 
length in Chapters II and III), I hypothesize that interpretation relates to both moral 
obligation and gratitude (as shown in Figure 1).  More specifically, I posited that people 
who process religious content more symbolically may be more likely to express 
autonomous moral obligation and connective gratitude.  Further, I wondered to what 
extent moral obligation may moderate relations between interpretation and gratitude: 
Would having an autonomous moral obligation strengthen associations between symbolic 
processing and the expression of connective gratitude? Might the use of a heteronomous 
moral obligation have the opposite effect?  
Figure 1 
Interpretation Model 
 
 
Transcendence.  The transcendence dimension of Wulff’s (1991) schema of 
religious attitudes describes the extent to which people believe in God or a higher power. 
Based upon previous findings that have shown few significant associations between 
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religious beliefs and moral reasoning, I hypothesize that transcendence will not relate to 
either moral obligation or gratitude as defined in this study (see Figure 2).  However, 
based on previous studies using alternate definitions of gratitude, I do believe that 
transcendence will relate to dispositional gratitude (i.e., a tendency to be grateful for the 
good things in life) as measured by the Gratitude Questionnaire-6 (GQ-6; McCullough, 
Emmons, & Tsang, 2002.  
 
Figure 2 
 
Transcendence Model  
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
As discussed briefly in the introduction, this study utilizes three main constructs: 
religiosity, moral obligation, and gratitude.  Each of these constructs has deep historical 
and theoretical foundations, albeit often contradictory and confusing.  As previous 
research examining gratitude and religiosity is marred by inconsistency and opacity, I 
believe it is important to carefully examine each construct and to clearly define how each 
is used in the current study.  
Religiosity  
Religion is omnipresent across the globe; approximately 84% of the world’s 
population identify with a religious group (Pew, 2012).  In addition to this ubiquity, 
religion is integral to the fabric of human existence and human history.  Durkheim 
(1915/2004) argued that religion helps humans to classify the world and unites them into 
a community.  Durkheim postulated that religious beliefs of the sacred and the profane 
(i.e., the good and bad elements of life) help to organize both the knowable and 
unknowable world around us.  Further, he argued that beyond a lexicon for understanding 
the world, religion is a communal institution, where beliefs belong to and unify the 
group.  Durkheim defined religion as “…a unified system of beliefs and practices 
relativeto sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden–beliefs and practices 
which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to 
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them” (1915/2004, p. 78).  Durkheim believed that religion offered a way of navigating 
the edges of understanding, by establishing cultural norms around the acceptable (or 
sacred) and the unacceptable (the profane).  In this way, religions offer a cultural 
framework for decision making, including moral and ethical decisions.    
Discussions of religion and psychology can be found throughout texts tracing 
back to antiquity, but contemporary theorists identify an 1882 address by G. Stanley Hall 
on moral and religious education as the beginning of modern studies of psychology and 
religion (Wulff, 1991).  Since then a multitude of philosophers, psychologists, 
theologians, and social science researchers have proposed myriad ways to define and 
measure the construct of religiosity, including religious affiliation, religious behavior, 
religious knowledge, ideology, religious experiences and religious education (Getz, 
1984).   
Although the bulk of his writings focused on cognitive development, Jean Piaget 
published a few papers examining religiosity (Wulff, 1991).  In these publications, Piaget 
delineated two religious attitudes: transcendence and immanence.  Transcendence refers 
to the belief that God operates beyond the understanding of humans, while an attitude of 
immanence refers to the belief that God lies within people.  Piaget posited that 
individuals fall into one of these attitudes based on their upbringing, including parental 
influence.  Piaget (1932/1965) found that when children exemplified unilateral respect 
they tended to use heteronomous moral reasoning, and were more likely to have a 
transcendent perspective of religion.  He also found that children who demonstrated 
mutual respect (developed through interactions with peers) tended to use autonomous 
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moral reasoning and were more likely to have an immanence attitude about religion 
(Wulff, 1991).   
In the past century, one of the most prominent and influential scholars in the 
psychology of religion has been Gordon Allport (Wulff, 1991).  Allport’s constructs of 
religion and resulting operationalizations have been some of the most widely adopted and 
utilized conceptualizations (Donahue, 1985; Wulff, 1991).  Allport believed that religion 
was not a single construct but composed of multiple factors as people are religious in 
different ways.  Allport initially delineated a linear dimension with intrinsic and extrinsic 
religiosity at each pole.  Allport defined an intrinsic orientation “as a meaning-endowing 
framework in terms of which all life is understood” and an extrinsic orientation as 
“comfort and social convention, a self-serving instrumental approach shaped to suit 
oneself” (Donahue, 1985, p. 400).  However, Allport soon changed this to an orthogonal 
approach, with intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity no longer opposites of one another, but 
independent dimensions.  This approach garnered more empirical support, as follow-up 
studies found no significant correlations between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity.  This 
orthogonal approach yielded 4 quadrants, or types of religious persons: intrinsic, 
extrinsic, indiscriminate, and non-religious (Donahue, 1985; Wulff, 1991).  Along with 
his colleague Michael Ross, Allport created the 20-item Religious Orientation Scale 
(ROS), which is still one of the most common instruments used to measure religiosity 
(Wulff, 1991).  However, Allport’s intrinsic and extrinsic orientations have been the 
subject of significant criticism.  As Wulff (1991) wrote in his book, Psychology of 
Religion, the available evidence did not support such a simplistic approach to a complex 
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phenomenon.  Further, Wulff discussed widespread concern that this approach may 
instead reflect personality variables as opposed to religiosity itself. 
Building upon the work of Allport and Ross, Daniel Batson added another 
dimension, quest (Sapp & Jones, 1986).  Batson defined quest as “an open-ended 
response dialogue with existential questions raised by the contradictions and tragedies of 
life” (Batson & Ventis, 1982, p. 152, quoted in Sapp & Jones, 1986, p. 209).  Batson 
developed a set of questions to assess this dimension and combined them with the 
intrinsic and extrinsic subscales of the ROS to create the Religious Life Inventory (RLI).   
Batson found that individuals with a quest orientation to religion were more likely to take 
into account the wishes of others and less likely to display prejudice than people with a 
predominantly intrinsic or extrinsic orientation (Wulff, 1991).  Batson described the quest 
orientation as “…a more mature, flexible type of religiosity than the other two” (Batson, 
1976, p. 207, quoted in Wulff, 1991, p. 237).  However, Batson’s concept and 
methodology have also come under considerable criticism, in part because his research 
was completed almost exclusively with college students, raising the concern that quest 
does not represent a religious orientation, but a developmental stage in faith development 
(Wulff, 1991).  Regardless of these criticisms, the majority of contemporary research on 
religiosity and moral development focuses on these three components (intrinsic, extrinsic, 
and quest), and uses the related measures, Allport’s Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) 
and Batson’s Religious Life Inventory (RLI) (Donahue, 1985; Sapp & Jones, 1986).    
David Wulff’s Schema of Religious Attitudes.  In response to the diversity of 
thought and lack of consensus about how to analyze and measure religion in social 
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science, David Wulff (1991) argued that conceptualizations of religion must address two 
aims (i.e., to be both descriptive and explanatory) and to reflect the lived experiences of 
religious and non-religious individuals. To address these two aims, Wulff created a 
schema of religious attitudes with two dimensions: (1) inclusion vs. exclusion of 
transcendence (i.e., descriptive), and (2) literal vs. symbolic processing of religion (i.e., 
explanatory)(Duriez & Soenens, 2006; Wulff, 1991).  These two dimensions can be 
plotted on a Euclidian plane to create four types or views of religion.  This schema can be 
used to organize both psychological approaches to religion and individuals (Wulff, 1991).   
The vertical axis (inclusion of transcendence vs. exclusion of transcendence) 
describes “…the degree to which the objects of religious interest are explicitly granted 
participation in a transcendent reality or, to the contrary, are limited to processes 
immanent within the mundane world” (Wulff, 1991, p. 630).  It is interesting to note that 
Wulff uses similar terminology to Piaget; he describes the vertical axis using the same 
terms—transcendent and immanent.  More simply, this dimension describes the extent to 
which individuals believe in God or another transcendent reality, thus delineating if 
individuals consider themselves to be religious (or spiritual) or not (Duriez & Soenens, 
2006; Krysinska et al., 2014).  The horizontal axis refers to the ways in which people 
process religious content.  Wulff defined this bi-polar variable as “…how consistently the 
expressions of religious faith—whether beliefs, images, or rituals—are interpreted either 
literally or symbolically” (pp. 630-631).  These two orthogonal dimensions create four 
distinct attitudes towards religion: literal affirmation (orthodoxy), literal disaffirmation 
(external critique), restorative interpretation (second naïveté), and reductive interpretation 
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(relativism) (Duriez & Soenens, 2006; Krysinska et al., 2014; Wulff, 1991).  These 
attitudes are represented in Figure 3.     
Figure 3 
Wulff’s Schema of Religious Attitudes (adapted from Wulff, 1991).  
 
 
Literal affirmation (quadrant I) is marked by a belief in the transcendent, as well 
as a literal interpretation of religious beliefs, texts, and symbols.  This quadrant 
frequently describes individuals who believe in orthodox or fundamentalist beliefs.  
Individuals who fall under restorative interpretation (quadrant II) believe in a religious or 
spiritual reality, but look for personal and symbolic meaning in religious content.  
Reductive interpretation (quadrant III) is demarcated by a rejection of a religious or 
spiritual reality, but in which an individual might still find symbolic or personal meaning 
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in religious or spiritual content.  Literal disaffirmation (quadrant IV) also represents a 
rejection of a religious or spiritual reality, but where religion is interpreted in a literal way 
(Duriez & Soenens, 2006; Wulff, 1991).  Since the origination of Wulff’s schema, Dirk 
Hutsebaut developed a self-report questionnaire, the Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS), to 
measure where an individual might fall in this model (Duriez & Hutsebaut, 2002).  This 
measure has since been validated and refined to represent all four quadrants, and is now 
comprised of 33 items (Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten, & Hutsebaut, 2003).  While the PCBS 
is intended for use in a secular society, it was developed for Judeo-Christian populations, 
and validated in Belgium, a predominantly Catholic nation. 
Moral Obligation 
In the existing literature examining religiosity, gratitude and moral reasoning, 
morality is largely defined and operationalized using Kohlberg’s stages of moral 
development.  Myriad scholars have critiqued this singular focus on Kohlberg’s work, 
largely because of concerns about generalizability as he used college-aged males to 
develop his stage theory (Wulff, 1991).  Jean Piaget’s theory of moral reasoning presents 
an alternative to this ubiquitous approach, as Piaget focused on feelings of obligation 
behind moral behavior (Piaget, 1932/1965).  Moral obligation is central to examining the 
impact of religion on moral reasoning and behavior: Why do people act morally?  Do they 
freely and willingly do the right thing?  Or do they do the right thing because a higher 
power or religious leader told them to do so?  The type of moral obligation used 
differentiates Piaget’s constructs of heteronomous and autonomous moral reasoning.   
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Based on his studies of children playing marbles, Piaget (1932/1965) delineated 
moral reasoning into two main phases: heteronomous and autonomous.  Children who 
demonstrated heteronomous judgement used rules imparted by adults and older children.  
In heteronomous reasoning, people with power (e.g., parents of a child) demand 
unilateral respect and determine what is right and wrong: “Right is to obey the will of the 
adult.  Wrong is to have a will of one’s own” (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 195).  According to 
Piaget, when obligation is based on duty (i.e., a duty to adhere to norms and rules 
established by others) moral decisions are heteronomous.  Children who demonstrated 
autonomous reasoning played more co-operatively and developed rules and norms 
mutually with their peers.  Piaget posited that when obligation is based on these types of 
mutually created rules and norms (i.e., desire to follow norms and rules established in 
cooperation with others), moral decisions are autonomous (Piaget, 1932/1965).  This 
parallels Piaget’s earlier work on religion, where he suggested that a transcendent 
religious attitude was the result of unilateral respect, whereas an immanent attitude was 
the result of mutual respect (Wulff, 1991).  Although not directly addressed by Piaget, it 
could be inferred that an immanent religious attitude (i.e., a belief that God lies within 
people) and autonomous moral obligation are related to one another, as both are based on 
unilateral respect among peers.   
This connection raises interesting questions: What type of respect exists between 
religious individuals and their Church or God?  Is this respect unilateral (i.e., all rules are 
dictated hierarchically) or mutual (i.e., rules are created cooperatively), or dependent on 
the context?  Previous research suggests that individuals subscribing to very orthodox or 
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fundamental religions may find it more difficult to employ autonomous moral reasoning.  
This hypothesis is supported by the work of Glover (1997) who found that conservative 
Christian groups in the southeast United States had lower levels of moral reasoning (i.e. 
more heteronomous) than did liberal or moderate groups.  Conservative groups were 
more likely to rely upon church doctrine when making moral decisions.  
Questions of unilateral and mutual respect are also relevant to research using 
Wulff’s religious attitudes and the Post-Critical Belief Scale.  Duriez (2004) found that 
how people process religion, as opposed to belief itself, is related to moral decision 
making.  Participants who processed religion more symbolically reasoned at a higher 
level on Kohlberg’s scale.  This could be because the more symbolically-minded subjects 
did not unilaterally accept their Church’s teachings and were able to place them into the 
context of the situation and autonomously reason through dilemmas.    
Gratitude  
Numerous definitions of gratitude have been used in social science research.  
Gratitude is most frequently conceptualized as a disposition or a positive emotion, and, 
less frequently, as an emotion that encourages reciprocity (Navarro & Morris, 2018).  A 
grateful disposition has been defined as “a generalized tendency to recognize and respond 
with grateful emotion to the roles of other people’s benevolence in the positive 
experiences and outcomes that one obtains” (McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002, p. 
112).  As an emotion, gratitude has been defined as a feeling that occurs after people 
receive aid which is perceived as costly, valuable, and altruistic (Wood, Maltby, Stewart, 
Linley, & Joseph, 2008).  Gratitude has also been conceptualized as an emotion (such as 
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thankfulness or joy) triggered in response to receiving a gift, which can motivate 
individuals to help others and build social connections (Emmons & Shelton, 2002; 
McCullough et al., 2002).   
In a recent qualitative analysis of peer-reviewed articles about gratitude in 
children and adolescents (N = 53), these common gratitude definitions were found (42% 
dispositional, 26% emotional) but additional facets also emerged (Navarro & Morris, 
2018).  Navarro and Morris identified multiple sub-themes when gratitude was defined as 
an emotion, including as general emotion (a positive feeling in response to benefit), as a 
social emotion (a positive feeling in response to a benefit from a benefactor), and as a 
relational emotion (a positive feeling in response to a benefit from a benefactor 
considering the intentions of and costs to the benefactor).  In addition to the dispositional 
and emotional conceptions, Navarro and Morris identified a third definition present in the 
literature: reciprocal gratitude (7%).  Reciprocal gratitude was defined as a positive 
feeling felt in response to a benefit from a benefactor and a desire to repay the benefactor.  
The disparate conceptualizations of gratitude used by social scientists present a 
significant problem for the validity of this field of research.   
Of further concern is the inconsistency between the construct of gratitude and its 
operationalization.  As has been elucidated previously (e.g., Gulliford, Morgan, & 
Kristjánsson, 2013; Tudge, Freitas, & O’Brien, 2015; Tudge & Freitas, 2018), most 
gratitude research uses the Gratitude Questionnaire-6 (GQ-6) (McCullough et al., 2002), 
which treats gratitude as a disposition and asks about gratitude for things.  For example, 
the GQ-6 contains statements like: “I have so much in life to be thankful for” and “When 
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I look at the world, I don’t see much to be grateful for.”  Navarro and Morris (2018) 
found that over half of the articles reviewed that defined gratitude as an emotion used the 
GQ-6—a theoretical and methodological mismatch.  None of the commonly used scales, 
including the GQ-6 and the Gratitude Adjective Checklist (GAC), ask about reciprocity 
or the connection between the benefactor and beneficiary.   
Gratitude as a virtue.  Building upon the philosophical perspectives of Aristotle 
(1985) and Annas (2011), and previous research on gratitude by Baumgarten-Tramer 
(1938), Tudge and Freitas (2018) argued that gratitude is more than a positive feeling or 
an appreciation for the good things in life—gratitude is a moral virtue with specific 
attributes.  A moral virtue guides one’s choices and actions, helping one to avoid both 
excess and deficiency (Aristotle, 1985).  Using this lens, gratitude is a disposition to live 
one’s life as a virtuously grateful person, avoiding both excess (obsequious gratitude) and 
vice (ingratitude).  Virtuous gratitude is not based on a heteronomous obligation or a duty 
to repay the benefactor, but an intrinsic motivation (or autonomous moral obligation) to 
reciprocate, therefore acting in accordance with one’s moral framework.  Further, both 
Aristotle and Annas posited that moral virtues are not innate but are learned through daily 
practice and virtuous “skills” can thus develop across the life-course.  Gratitude 
researchers (e.g., Baumgarten-Tramer, 1938; Freitas et al., 2011; Navarro et al., 2018) 
have found that the virtue of gratitude is not inherent; it develops across time and this 
development can be augmented by regular practice.   
An additional perspective may be helpful when thinking about gratitude as a 
virtue—ingratitude (Tudge, 2018).  Ingratitude is not a feeling or disposition; it is 
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inaction in response to a benefit from a benefactor.  Imagine a situation in which person 
A is given a lift home from work by person B because it is pouring rain.  The beneficiary 
is very appreciative, thanks the benefactor profusely, and feels a genuine positive 
emotion.  The next week person A is driving to work and sees person B stranded by the 
side of the road and needing a ride, but person A drives by without stopping.  Would you 
consider person A to be grateful (they did say “thank you” and felt a warm positive 
emotion, after all), or ungrateful because they did not reciprocate the same benefit to 
person B when having a clear opportunity to do so?  Tudge (2018) posited that person A 
displayed ingratitude by not stopping to help person B, regardless of his or her level or 
type of appreciation.  This vignette underscores the polarity between these two 
constructs; gratitude (a virtue) is the inverse of ingratitude (a vice) (Emmons, 2016).  
Gratitude is reciprocal action to do the right thing based on a moral imperative.   
In 1938, Franziska Baumgarten-Tramer wrote about gratitude based upon her 
extensive research with Swiss children and adolescents.  Baumgarten-Tramer broadly 
defined gratitude as a “reactive sentiment” to an act of kindness or assistance, and 
delineated four components: (1) happiness or joy at the received gift, help, or kindness, 
(2) saying thank you to the benefactor to indicate the pleasure received, (3) a desire to 
repay the benefactor, and (4) a moral obligation to repay the benefactor.  In sum, she 
articulated that gratitude goes beyond saying thank you: “…thanks should not be 
‘empty,’ that is to say, should not consist of words only but take some concrete form” 
(1938, p. 55).  Baumgarten-Tramer also described how gratitude developed in the 
children and adolescents in her study; they displayed different modes of gratitude based 
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on their cognitive and moral development, as well as the context in which they lived.  She 
articulated four types of gratitude: verbal (i.e., saying thank you or other words to express 
gratefulness), concrete (i.e., an egocentric desire to reciprocate to the benefactor), 
connective (i.e., a desire to reciprocate, taking into account the wishes of the benefactor), 
and finalistic (i.e., a desire to reciprocate through contributions to society or their own 
personal development in the future) (Baumgarten-Tramer, 1938).    
Combining the philosophical lens of Aristotle and Annas and the work of 
Baumgarten-Tramer, Tudge and Freitas (2018) have pioneered new research on the 
development of gratitude as a moral virtue.  Tudge and Freitas conceptualize gratitude as 
benefit-triggered (similar to how other researchers have defined gratitude), but emphasize 
the altruistic intentions of the benefactor and added two additional layers: (1) gratitude is 
to a benefactor rather than for a benefit given by a benefactor, and (2) “the beneficiary 
has to freely wish to repay the benefactor, if possible and when appropriate, with 
something deemed to be of value to the benefactor” (p. 4).   
Tudge and Freitas (2018) also utilized the different types of gratitude expression 
initially described by Baumgarten-Tramer: verbal, concrete, and connective gratitude.  In 
addition to these typologies, Tudge and Freitas identified additional categories in their 
recent cross-cultural research with children and adolescents.  These categories included: 
(a) no gratitude expressed or “don’t know” (i.e., no gratitude expressed for a benefit 
received or lack of understanding about how to express gratitude), (b) self-sufficient (e.g., 
“Nobody can help me get the things I want; only I can do that”), and (c) other (i.e., any 
other responses that do not fit into other categories).  Children and adolescents in Tudge 
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and Freitas’ research also expressed combinations of these types of gratitude.  For 
example, a child might express both verbal and concrete gratitude (e.g., “I would thank 
them from the bottom of my heart and give them my favorite stuffed animal”) or verbal 
and connective gratitude (e.g., “I would thank them and then help them with anything 
they needed”).   
As conceptualized by Tudge and Freitas (2018), the different expressions of 
gratitude are not hierarchical (i.e., concrete gratitude is not closer to a virtue than verbal 
gratitude or vice versa).  However, they theorized connective gratitude as being the 
closest form of gratitude expression to gratitude as a virtue.  This conceptualization and 
operationalization of gratitude will be used in the present study.  To reduce confusion 
between the construct of gratitude as a virtue and other definitions, gratitude as a virtue 
will henceforth be written in plain text, while other definitions of gratitude will be 
demarcated as such: /gratitude/. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
/Gratitude/ and Religion 
As no research has yet been published examining gratitude as a virtue and 
religiosity, this section will focus on research completed with other definitions of 
/gratitude/.  Recent research has identified many benefits of practicing /gratitude/ across 
personal, relational, and social domains (Tsang & Martin, 2016).  Specifically, the 
practice of /gratitude/ has been associated with an increase in pro-social behaviors (Al-
Seheel & Noor, 2016; Kraus, Desmond, & Palmer, 2015; Lambert, Fincham, Braithwaite, 
Graham, & Beach, 2009; Rosmarin, Pirutinsky, Cohen, Galler, & Krumrei, 2011), a 
reduction in symptoms of depression and anxiety (Al-Seheel & Noor, 2016; Lambert et 
al., 2009; Rosmarin et al., 2011), improved physical health (Rosmarin et al., 2011), 
higher life satisfaction (Kraus et al., 2015), reduced materialism (Al-Seheel & Noor, 
2016; Lambert et al., 2009), and stronger social connections and community cohesion 
(Al-Seheel & Noor, 2016; Lambert et al., 2009).  Religiosity has also been linked to a 
multitude of positive outcomes.  Research suggests that religiosity is positively associated 
with emotional well-being, prosociality, physical health, moral reasoning and 
commitment, and negatively associated with risk taking behavior (Hardy, Skalski, & 
Melling, 2014; Tsang & Martin, 2016).  
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As discussed in the introduction, /gratitude/ is a key element of monotheistic 
religions and is the focus of multitudinous passages in sacred texts, prayers and beliefs; 
within these contexts, /gratitude/ to a higher power for life’s gifts is ubiquitous (Emmons, 
2005).  Previous social science research on /gratitude/ and religiosity has found positive 
associations between the constructs, “such that religious people are more grateful (to God 
and significant others), forgiving, and less materialistic than those who are less 
predisposed to gratefulness” (Al-Seheel & Noor, 2016, p. 687).  Further, research has 
indicated that /gratitude/ is positively associated with a belief in God, spirituality, and the 
frequency and quality of both worship and prayer (Rosmarin et al., 2011).  In addition, 
prior research shows stronger correlations between /gratitude/ and intrinsic beliefs (i.e., a 
true faith in God) as opposed to extrinsic religiosity (e.g., church attendance) (Emmons, 
2005).   
Defining and operationalizing gratitude and religion.  While an initial review 
of existing studies suggests a positive association between religiosity and /gratitude/, a 
closer examination reveals a clear limitation—each study defines and operationalizes 
these two constructs differently.  Before stepping into a full analysis of the literature, I 
will first examine how both religion and /gratitude/ are defined, measured, and 
operationalized.   
Defining religion.  When explicitly defined by the authors, most of the studies 
reviewed utilized two main components of religion: intrinsic beliefs and extrinsic 
practices.  While intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity were measured in most of the studies 
examined, several authors went beyond this simple duality.  In their study of religion and 
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moral reasoning, Duriez and Soenens (2006) employed Wulff’s (1991) schema of 
religious attitudes.  Kraus et al. (2015) used another approach to conceptualize and 
operationalize religiosity.  They examined eight different components: religious 
affiliation (e.g., Christianity, Judaism, Islam, etc.), religious participation (e.g., worship 
attendance), private devotion (e.g., prayer frequency), religious salience (i.e., intrinsic 
belief), religious efficacy (i.e., “experiencing an answer to one’s prayers and/or a miracle 
from God” (p. 1333)), religious friends, otherworldly beliefs, and spiritual but not 
religious.  As this study was part of a large nationwide survey on religion among youth, 
various measures were included to assess many facets of religiosity (Kraus et al., 2015).  
Lambert et al. (2009) also separated prayer (private devotion according to Kraus et al.) 
and worship frequency (religious participation according to Kraus et al.) in a similar 
approach, as they hypothesized that while highly correlated these two actions are separate 
constructs with different outcomes.  Definitions of religiosity are compared in Table 1.  
Authors who did not define or measure religion explicitly are not included in Table 1 
(e.g., Al-Seheel & Noor, 2016; Tsang & Martin, 2016).   
Measuring religion.  Paralleling the divergent definitions of religion used across 
studies of /gratitude/ and religion, many different measurement tools were also used.   In 
fact, no two studies used the same measure, making comparisons difficult.  As mentioned 
above, Duriez and Soenens (2006) used a previously developed measure, the PCBS, to 
measure religiosity across Wulff’s dimensions.  Li and Chow (2015) also used a 
previously developed measure, the Religiousness Scale, to examine intrinsic and extrinsic 
elements of religiosity.  Tsang et al. (2012) utilized the Religious Orientation Scale, 
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developed by Allport and Ross.  A couple of the authors stated that their measures had 
been previously validated, but failed to articulate the scale used (e.g., Kraus et al., 2015; 
Lambert, 2009).  Three studies created original non-validated measures, citing concerns 
that existing scales did not reflect the constructs they were attempting to measure (e.g., 
Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Hardy et al., 2016; Rosmarin et al., 2011).  Lambert et al. (2009) 
used a standardized measure of prayer, but also used their own measures for religious 
participation and religiosity (one item each).   
 Clearly, measurement of religiosity is wide-ranging and divergent, paralleling the 
different definitions previously articulated.  The use of these different measures reflects 
discontent with current approaches, and theoretical concerns about trying to quantify 
religiosity.  For example, Hardy and Carlo (2005) questioned how constructs of 
religiosity are measured and suggested they may be difficult to disentangle from 
prosociality.  Further, Tsang and Martin (2016) expressed concerns about the social 
desirability bias inherent in self-report measures of religiosity.  King and Crowther 
(2004) questioned the generalizability of current measures to non-Judeo-Christian 
populations, as most of the existing measures of religiosity were developed by Christian 
researchers working with majority Christian populations (King & Crowther, 2004).   
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Table 1 
Definitions and Measures of Religiosity 
Source Definition Measure 
Duriez & Soenens, 
2006 
No concise definition; examined 
religion across two axes: 
exclusion vs. inclusion of 
transcendence, literal vs. 
symbolic.   
PCBS 
Hardy & Carlo, 2005 “commitment to, identification 
with and involvement in a 
religion or system of religious 
beliefs” (p. 231) 
Novel measure to look 
at religious salience, 
involvement, and 
identity 
 
Hardy et al., 2016  “beliefs and behaviors associated 
with a particular religion 
affiliation” (p. 339) 
 
Novel measure – 16 
items to assess type, 
frequency and quality of 
religious activities 
 
King & Crowther, 
2004 
“Religion is an organized system 
of beliefs, practices, rituals and 
symbols designed (a) to facilitate 
closeness to the sacred or 
transcendent (God, higher power, 
or ultimate truth/reality), and (b) 
to foster an understanding of 
one’s relation and responsibility 
to others in living together in a 
community” (p. 85) 
 
N/A - secondary 
Kraus et al., 2015 No concise definition; examined 
8 dimensions of religiosity:  
• religious affiliation 
• religious participation 
• private devotion 
• religious salience 
• religious efficacy 
• religious friends 
Multiple measures not 
named, part of NSYR 
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• otherworldly beliefs 
• spiritual but not religious 
Lambert et al., 2009 No explicit definition Used measures of 
prayer (3-items 
previously validated), 
religious participation 
(1-item) and religiosity 
(1-item) 
 
Li & Chow, 2015 “people’s devotion to certain 
religious beliefs or practices” (p. 
150) 
 
12-item Religiousness 
Scale (Strayhorn, 
Weidman, & Larson, 
1990) to measure 
intrinsic and extrinsic 
concepts 
Rosmarin et al., 2011 Defined only as religious 
commitment  
Multi-denominational 
measure of religious 
commitment: 
• degree of belief in 
God  
• importance of 
religion in general 
• importance of 
religious identity 
• extent to which 
religious beliefs lie 
behind approach to 
life 
• extent of carrying 
over religion into rest 
of life 
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Tsang et al., 2012  “intrinsically religious were 
described as secure individuals 
who develop a mature personality 
centered around their religious 
beliefs.  These individuals allow 
religious teachings and religious 
compassion to motivate their 
entire lives” (p. 41) 
Allport & Ross (1967) 
measure of intrinsic 
religiosity  
 
 
Defining and measuring gratitude.  As outlined in Chapter II, the construct of 
/gratitude/ has been defined in various ways.   Of the articles that explicitly defined 
/gratitude/, reviewed by Navarro and Morris (2018), seven of nine defined the construct 
as benefit-triggered gratitude (e.g., Al-Seheel & Noor 2016; Emmons, 2005; Kraus et al., 
2015; Li & Chow, 2015; Rosmarin et al., 2011; Tsang et al., 2012; Tsang & Martin, 
2016).  Emmons (2005), Kraus et al. (2015), Tsang et al. (2012), and Tsang and Martin 
(2016) added an additional layer to /gratitude/; they posited that the benefit must be given 
freely and altruistically by the benefactor.  Tsang and Martin (2016) also conceived of 
/gratitude/ as positive reciprocity as opposed to thankfulness out of obligation or guilt.  
Lambert et al. (2009) defined /gratitude/ more broadly, as they included both benefit-
triggered /gratitude/ and /gratitude/ as an emotion: “the emotion or state resulting from 
having an awareness and appreciation of that which is valuable and meaningful to 
oneself” (Lambert et al., 2009, p. 140).  Beyond secular approaches to /gratitude/, Al-
Seheel and Noor (2016) and Rosmarin et al. (2011) included religious elements in their 
definitions; both sets of authors included God as a benefactor.   
Even though the examined studies defined /gratitude/ differently, almost all of 
them used the same measure, the Gratitude Questionnaire (GQ-6).  As discussed in 
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Chapter II, the GQ-6 treats gratitude as a disposition and asks about gratitude for things.    
In keeping with their definition of /gratitude/, Rosmarin et al. (2011) modified the GQ-6 
to reflect the inclusion of God (i.e., the Religious Gratitude Questionnaire or RGQ).  
When looking across this body of research, there is a clear incongruency between the 
conceptualizations of /gratitude/ and how they are operationalized.  Table 2 delineates the 
/gratitude/ definitions used across the reviewed articles. 
 
Table 2 
 
Definitions and Measures of /Gratitude/ 
  
Source Definition Measure 
Al-Seheel & Noor, 2016 “Gratitude is the ability to recognize and 
appreciate one’s positive gain or benefit 
that is delivered by an external source 
whether via human or non-human agents 
(e.g., God)” (p. 687).   
Do not have 
measure; use 
gratitude 
intervention  
Emmons, 2005 “It is the appreciation felt after one has 
been the beneficiary of an altruistic act” 
(Emmons, 2005, p. 239) 
N/A – 
secondary 
Kraus et al., 2015 “We define gratitude as ‘‘a positive 
emotional reaction to the receipt of a 
benefit that is perceived to have resulted 
from the good intentions of another’’ 
(As cited in Tsang, 2006, p. 139)” (p. 
1332).   
Two items 
Lambert et al., 2009 “We conceive of gratitude more broadly to 
include both the emotion resulting from a 
specific, conferred benefit (benefit-
triggered gratitude), as well as 
acknowledging the value of another 
GQ-6 
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person’s (or thing’s) general attributes or 
being (generalized gratitude)” (p. 140).   
 
Li & Chow, 2015 “A generalized tendency to recognize and 
respond with grateful emotion to the roles 
of other people’s benevolence in the 
positive experiences and outcomes that one 
obtains” (p. 152).   
GQ-6 
Rosmarin et al., 2011 “occurs exclusively in the context of 
perceiving benefit at the hands of an agent, 
such as a fellow human being or God” (p. 
389).   
GQ-6, RGQ 
(GQ-6 adapted 
to reflect 
religious 
gratitude) 
Tsang et al., 2012;  
Tsang & Martin, 2016 
“a positive emotional reaction to the 
receipt of a benefit that is perceived to 
have resulted from the good intentions of 
another” (p. 42). 
GQ-6 
 
 
Associations between religiosity and /gratitude/.  Most studies reviewed found 
positive associations between religion and /gratitude/, although several of the studies 
found some ambiguity, particularly differences between grateful attitudes and grateful 
behaviors. 
Cross-sectional studies.  The associational studies demonstrated numerous 
correlations between /gratitude/ and religiosity.  In their study of Catholic high school 
students in Hong Kong, Li and Chow (2015) found that religiosity and spirituality were 
associated with peer-helping prosocial behaviors (including /gratitude/), but not stranger-
helping behaviors.  They also found that religiosity had a curvilinear relation with peer-
helping prosocial behaviors: moderately religious teens reported lower peer-helping 
prosociality than did teens who were slightly or highly religious (Li & Chow, 2015).  
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This finding supported their previous research which found that moderately religious 
believers showed the highest obedience than did the extremes of the continuum.  Li and 
Chow (2015) hypothesized that moderately religious individuals may not act prosocially 
when prosociality is not a normative or supported part of their faith community.    
Kraus et al. (2015) found that seven of the dimensions of religiosity they 
examined (except for spiritual not religious) were positively associated with /gratitude/. 
However, when all dimensions were included in the model, only religious efficacy and 
religious friends were significantly correlated with /gratitude/.  Further, religious 
affiliation had no association with /gratitude/, suggesting that it is not specific affiliation 
(e.g., Catholicism, Judaism, etc.) that encourages /gratitude/, but other dimensions of 
religiosity.     
Rosmarin et al. (2011) used a different approach; rather than studying the 
associations between religion and /gratitude/ they attempted to explore whether religious 
gratitude is a separate construct from secular gratitude. They found that while secular 
gratitude was tied to well-being regardless of religion, religious gratitude was 
additionally beneficial.  
Experimental studies.  Four studies used experimental designs to investigate the 
relationship between various aspects of religion and /gratitude/.  In their study of Muslim 
college students in Malaysia, Al-Seheel and Noor (2016) used an experimental design to 
see whether religious and secular /gratitude/ interventions would improve happiness and 
well-being.  As opposed to more secular research, this study focused on /gratitude/ to 
God.  Muslim students in the Islamic-based /gratitude/ intervention group showed higher 
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levels of happiness over time than did the other conditions (Al-Seheel & Noor, 2016).  
Al-Seheel and Noor (2016) hypothesized this could be because /gratitude/ is very closely 
linked to Allah and an integral cultural practice.  This has relevance for real-world 
applications, as it encourages /gratitude/ interventions to be culturally relevant: “This 
study argues that for Muslims an Islamic-based gratitude is more effective in increasing 
their happiness because this religious-based gratitude matches their beliefs and addresses 
their spiritual needs” (Al-Seheel & Noor, 2016, p. 698).   
Tsang et al. (2012) used a quasi-experimental design to investigate how religiosity 
(made salient through priming) is associated with grateful attitudes and/or grateful 
behaviors in a distributive task.  They found that participants who scored higher on 
intrinsic religiosity had higher self-reported /gratitude/, but did not behave more 
gratefully than did other participants.  Lambert et al. (2009) found that prayer was 
associated with /gratitude/; participants in a prayer condition had higher gratitude scores 
than did those in a control condition.   
Discussion of the existing literature examining /gratitude/ and religion.  
While most of the existing literature points to positive associations between these two 
constructs, more research is needed to confirm and further clarify this association.  
Further, as the current body of literature is mostly correlational and confounded by 
inconsistencies in construct definitions and measurement, it is difficult to disentangle 
what mechanisms might explain associations between /gratitude/ and religiosity.  
However, the existing body of literature does offer several possible mechanisms.  
Hardy and Carol (2005) posited that growing up in a religious community may socialize 
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people to exhibit prosocial behaviors, with prosocial attitudes mediating the relationship 
between religiosity and prosocial behaviors.  In other words, religion could increase 
prosocial values which in turn could increase prosocial actions.  However, evidence does 
not necessarily support this hypothesis; Tsang et al. (2012) found that higher religiosity 
was not correlated with grateful behaviors.   
 In later work, Hardy and colleagues (2014) hypothesized that /gratitude/ itself 
could possibly mediate previously found positive associations between religion and 
prosocial behaviors.  Alternatively, they also suggested that rather than altruistic 
/gratitude/, it could be that strong social norms obligate religious people to act 
prosocially. Further, they also speculated that intrinsic belief in the transcendent could 
mediate the relationship between religiosity and prosocial behaviors; that religious 
people’s actual belief in a higher power inspires them to act prosocially.  
Taking a different perspective, Tsang and Martin (2016) wrote that prayer itself 
may be one of the mediators between religiosity and /gratitude/.  Prayer often serves as a 
avenue to give thanks, and this repeated everyday practice may help a person be grateful 
in other life domains.  Further, they posited that religiosity may act cyclically to 
encourage prosocial behaviors; communal worship increases social bonds which 
reinforce participation in religious activities, which subsequently encourage increased 
prayer, and in turn fosters higher levels of /gratitude/.  Lambert and colleagues (2009) 
also identified prayer as a key mechanism in this dynamic relationship.  They suggested 
that prayer increases self-reflection about morality and increases time people are thinking 
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about gratefulness.  These hypothesized pathways suggest a complex and deeply 
interconnected relationship between gratitude and religiosity.    
Moral Reasoning and Religiosity 
While philosophers and theologians often argue that morality and religiosity are 
inextricably linked, research in psychology and other social sciences has not found a lot 
of empirical support for this association (Sapp & Jones, 1986).  In their 1981 treatise on 
religion and morality, Kohlberg and Power postulated that moral development and faith 
development serve different functions and are largely unrelated to one another (Glover, 
1997; Kohlberg & Power, 1981; Sapp & Jones, 1986).  Kohlberg and Power argued that 
religious reasoning is based on the rules and teachings of religious authority.  They saw 
religion as a way of giving meaning to life, especially in the face of existential questions 
about the purpose of morality: “Religion helps us to accept our duty to be moral even in 
the face of evidence that acting morally will not lead to any tangible nonmoral rewards, 
such as pleasure” (Kolhberg & Power, 1981, p. 212).  Kohlberg and Power argued that 
moral reasoning is based on cognitive development, issues of justice, and life experience.    
Kohlberg and Power’s (1981) perspective parallels the findings of many empirical 
studies which do not show positive correlations between moral reasoning and religiosity, 
regardless of the construct and operationalization of religiosity.  In fact, some studies 
have suggested a negative correlation, where religious people are more likely to use 
conventional (as opposed to post-conventional) reasoning (Duriez & Soenens, 2006).  
Further, similar research suggests that religious people are more intolerant of other racial 
   
34 
and ethnic groups, and no more likely to engage in benevolent actions than non-religious 
people (Sapp & Jones, 1986).    
Some studies have looked at the relationship between moral reasoning and 
religiosity by examining both religious beliefs and values (i.e., ideology), and religious 
affiliation (e.g., Christian, Jewish, Muslim, etc.) (Getz, 1984).  Research in the late 1970s 
found that members of liberal churches were more likely to display post-conventional 
levels of moral reasoning (Getz, 1984).  Further, this study found that in liberal churches, 
leaders were more likely to display post-conventional moral reasoning than were their 
parishioners, but among conservative churches leaders were more likely to display 
conventional levels of reasoning than their followers were.  Getz (1984) also found that 
whereas some fundamentalist Christians understood complex moral dilemmas, many of 
them would ultimately follow the teachings of their church, regardless of their individual 
perspective.  In their study of children and adolescents, Batson and Ventis found a 
curvilinear relationship; young children in Catholic schools displayed sophisticated moral 
reasoning earlier than their secularly schooled peers did, but as young adults they were 
more likely to operate at a conventional level of moral reasoning without the ability to 
use post-conventional reasoning (Sapp & Jones, 1986).  Most research on affiliation (the 
vast majority of which has only been done with Judeo-Christian populations) has found 
no differences in the levels of moral reasoning between religions (Getz, 1984).    
Rather than ideology or affiliation, most research examining religiosity and 
morality has used Gordon Allport’s dimensions of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity.  
However, this line of research has not found significant associations.  Initially researchers 
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hypothesized that individuals high in intrinsic religiosity would also have higher levels of 
moral reasoning (Getz, 1984).   However, no such correlations have been found (Duriez 
& Soenens, 2006; Getz, 1984; Sapp & Jones, 1986).  Some research even suggests that 
higher levels of extrinsic religiosity are negatively associated with moral reasoning 
(Glover, 1997; Sapp & Jones, 1986).    
However, Batson’s quest dimension has been found to be correlated with higher 
levels of moral reasoning (Duriez & Soenens, 2006; Glover, 1997).  Individuals who 
scored high on the quest dimension also tended to use more to use more complex mental 
processes when analyzing moral issues (Sapp & Jones, 1986).   However, some theorists 
question whether quest is really a dimension of religiosity, or merely an indication of 
high cognitive functioning.  If it is an indication of cognitive ability, in Kohlberg’s view, 
it would have a positive correlation to moral reasoning, which is closely related to 
cognitive development (Kohlberg & Power, 1981).     
 Glover (1997) combined these two approaches and looked at the intrinsic, 
extrinsic, and quest dimensions across three different types of Christian ideology (liberal, 
moderate, and conservative denominations) in the southeast United States.  Glover found 
that moral reasoning was unrelated to the intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions, but 
positively correlated with both the quest dimension and level of education.  Glover also 
found a significant difference in the level of moral reasoning across all three groups, with 
significantly lower means for the conservative groups.  Overall, she found higher levels 
of moral reasoning in liberal and moderate groups than in conservative groups, where 
people relied church doctrine for moral decision making.  These findings echo Piaget’s 
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theories of moral reasoning; the conservative groups were using heteronomous reasoning, 
where individual will yields to a higher authority to determine what is right and wrong 
(Piaget, 1932/1965).     
Recent research on religiosity and moral reasoning has used Wulff’s model of 
religious attitudes.  Duriez and Soenens (2006) used the PCBS and Kohlberg’s Moral 
Judgement Test to examine the relationship between Wulff’s two dimensions of 
religiosity (i.e., inclusion vs. exclusion of transcendence and literal vs. symbolic 
interpretation) and moral reasoning.  This study was completed with Flemish 
undergraduate students, adolescents and adults, most of whom were Catholic.  Duriez and 
Soenens (2006) found that participants higher in symbolic interpretation were more likely 
to display higher stages of moral reasoning.  These effects held even after controlling for 
level of education.  Duriez and Soenens (2006) argued that how people process religion is 
more indicative of morality than religious belief itself: “The impact of the way people 
process religious contents… seems vitally important, with people processing religious 
contents in a literal way not only showing less advanced moral reasoning abilities but 
also less psychological well-being, less empathy and more prejudice” (p. 80).   
While not directly measuring moral reasoning, Duriez and colleagues (2004) also 
examined associations between religiosity and empathy in another study of Flemish 
undergraduate students.  Although the study explicitly addressed empathy, it does 
illuminate possible correlations between religiosity and the ability to take the perspective 
of others, a key component in the development of moral virtues like gratitude.  Duriez 
(2004) used the PCBS and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index as a measure of empathy, 
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which includes a perspective-taking subscale.  Duriez (2004) found no correlation 
between the transcendence dimension and empathy, but did find positive associations 
between symbolic interpretation and both empathy and perspective taking.  These 
findings suggest that religious belief itself is not related to empathy or the likelihood to 
help someone in need, but that how people process religious information could be related 
to empathy and the ability to take the perspective of others.  This has implications for 
character education, especially curricula and interventions intending to increase prosocial 
behaviors and moral virtues, as efforts focusing on symbolic processing could increase 
empathy and perspective taking.   
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In this study I examined associations between gratitude as a virtue, moral 
obligation, and two dimensions of religiosity: interpretation and transcendence.  Based on 
existing studies looking at religion, /gratitude/, and moral reasoning, I hypothesized that 
two components of connective gratitude, as conceptualized by Baumgarten-Tramer 
(1938) and Tudge and Freitas (2018), relate to religiosity.    
The first component, the notion that the beneficiary should consider the 
benefactor’s intentions, is impacted by the beneficiary’s ability to perspective take.  As 
discussed previously, Duriez (2004) found a positive association between the symbolic 
interpretation of religion and the ability to perspective take (r = .24, p < .0001).  Applied 
to gratitude, people who more symbolically interpret religion may be more likely to be 
able to recognize the intentions of their benefactor, and thus be able to express connective 
gratitude more frequently.    
The second component (i.e., the beneficiary should freely choose to repay the 
benefactor if given the chance) can also be related to previous research about religion and 
moral reasoning.  As outlined by Tudge et al. (2015), the benefactor must freely choose to 
repay the benefactor.  This implies that the benefactor feels autonomous moral obligation, 
not heteronomous obligation.  Previous research has found that religious persons valued 
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tradition and conformity over self-direction (Fontaine et al., 2005; Schwartz & Huismans, 
1995).  Further, Glover (1997) found that followers of conservative Christian groups 
were less likely to use postconventional moral reasoning (where the “reasoner judges by 
principle than by convention” (Glover, 1997, p. 248)) than were people affiliated with 
liberal or moderate groups.  Glover’s use of Kohlberg’s postconventional reasoning 
parallels the use of Piaget’s autonomous moral obligation in this study; both ideas require 
the reasoner to rely on an internal sense of morality, as opposed to group rules or duty.  
As such, I hypothesized that individuals who process religion more symbolically will be 
more likely to demonstrate autonomous moral obligation than will individuals who 
process religion more literally.  Applied to the virtue of gratitude, I hypothesized that 
individuals who process religion more symbolically will be more likely to demonstrate 
connective gratitude than will individuals who process religion more literally.   
In addition to these questions related to the processing of religion, I examined 
associations among the transcendence dimension of religion, moral obligation, and 
gratitude.  Does faith in a higher power relate to the expression of autonomous moral 
obligation and/or connective gratitude?  As previous studies have found little support for 
relations between moral reasoning and belief in God (Glover, 1997; Kohlberg & Power, 
1981; Sapp & Jones, 1986), I hypothesized that there would be no significant associations 
between transcendence and either moral obligation or connective gratitude.  
Previous research has found positive associations between /gratitude/ and a belief 
in God, as well as the frequency and quality of both worship and prayer (Emmons, 2005; 
Rosmarin et al., 2011).  In accordance with these findings, I hypothesized that individuals 
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who scored higher in the transcendence dimension (indicating a greater belief in the 
possibility of God or a higher power) were more likely to display /gratitude/ than those 
who scored lower in the transcendence dimension (indicating a greater exclusion of the 
possibility of a God or higher power).  I tested this hypothesis using the GQ-6, the most 
commonly utilized measure of /gratitude/.  As discussed in the literature review, the GQ-
6 measures gratitude for things and focuses on appreciation as opposed to the virtue of 
gratitude (Tudge & Freitas, 2018).  Any differences between the findings of how 
gratitude as a virtue (measured by the WAGS) and /gratitude/ (measured by the GQ-6) 
relate to transcendence could underscore the differences between these constructs of 
gratitude, and further call into question how gratitude is conceptualized and measured in 
the social sciences.  
Interpretation 
1. Is the interpretation and processing of religion associated with gratitude or moral 
obligation?  Does moral obligation moderate any associations between the 
interpretation of religion and gratitude? 
1.1 Religious interpretation will be positively associated with the expression 
of connective gratitude, and negatively associated with the expression of 
other types of gratitude (i.e., verbal, concrete and verbal/concrete 
gratitude).  
1.2 Religious interpretation will be positively associated with the expression 
autonomous moral obligation.  
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1.3 Autonomous moral obligation will moderate relations between scores of 
religious interpretation and the expression of connective gratitude (i.e., the 
relation between religious interpretation and the expression of connective 
gratitude will be stronger when autonomous moral obligation is 
expressed).  
1.4 Heteronomous moral obligation will moderate relations between scores of 
religious interpretation and the expression of other types of gratitude (i.e., 
the relation between religious interpretation and the expression of other 
types of gratitude [verbal, concrete and verbal/concrete] will be stronger 
when heteronomous moral obligation is expressed).  
Figure 4 
Interpretation of Religion Model with Hypotheses 
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Transcendence  
2. Is the belief in a God or higher power associated with either moral obligation or 
the expression of gratitude?  
2.1 Scores of transcendence will have no significant association with the 
expression of heteronomous or autonomous moral obligation.  
2.2 Scores of transcendence will have no significant association with the 
expression of verbal, concrete, verbal/concrete, or connective gratitude. 
2.3 Scores of transcendence will be positively associated with GQ-6 scores. 
Figure 5 
Transcendence Model with Hypotheses 
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CHAPTER V 
METHODS 
The research design for this study was correlational; I utilized a cross-sectional 
online survey with multiple measures of religiosity, gratitude, and moral obligation.  
Participants 
Participants were recruited from several large undergraduate classes on human 
development at a university in the Southeastern United States.  Descriptive characteristics 
are presented in Table 3.  The majority (92.6%) of the sample was aged between 18 and 
22 and also largely female (92.7%).  More than three-quarters (80.3%) of the respondents 
indicated they were of Christian faith, and of those, most did not indicate a specific 
denomination (71.1%).  As the PCBS was designed for use in Christian and secular 
populations, the sample of the current study (N = 698) was narrowed to include only 
persons who indicated they were either Christian, Atheist/agnostic, or not religious (n = 
648).
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Table 3 
Descriptive Characteristics of Sample 
Variables (N = 698) 
 
               #        % 
Age   
18-22 646  (92.6) 
23-26   32  (  4.6) 
27-35   13  (  1.9) 
35 or above     7  (  1.0) 
Gender   
Female 647  (92.7) 
Male 49  (  7.0) 
Other 2  (  0.3) 
Religion   
Atheist/Agnostic* 29   (  4.2) 
Christian* 550   (80.3) 
Islam 19   (  2.8) 
Judaism 3   (  0.4) 
None/Not Religious* 69   (  9.9) 
Spiritual 11   (  1.6) 
Other 4   (  0.5) 
Christian sub-types    
Not specified 391  (71.1) 
Baptist 54  (  9.8) 
Catholic 75  (13.6) 
Other 30  (  5.5) 
Note. * groups included in final analyses (n = 648).  
Procedure 
 Data were collected from students in the spring and fall of 2018, as well as the 
spring of 2019, using an online survey platform (Qualtrics).  Students were offered extra 
credit points for their participation.  Participants were required to read the informed 
consent information and consent to participate before being directed to the survey, which 
consisted of 43 questions.  
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Measures 
Post-Critical Belief Scale.  The PCBS (Hustebaut, 1996) was developed to 
measure Wulff’s (1991) schema of religious attitudes.  The PCBS has since been revised 
and the fourth version (Fontaine et al., 2005) was used in this study.  The PCBS is a 33-
item measure designed to assess religiosity across two dimensions (i.e., transcendence 
and interpretation) using items designed to measure four attitudes of religiosity (i.e., 
orthodoxy, second naïveté, relativism, and external critique).  Each item was scored on a 
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree.  Although 
previous studies using this measure have only been completed in Europe, reliability 
analysis on the present data set was excellent.  The internal consistency (as measured by 
a) for the four attitudes (factors) ranged from .682 to .882, and the resulting 
transcendence and interpretation dimensions ranged from .755 to .853.  
WAGS.   The original version of the Wishes and Gratitude Survey (Freitas, 
Tudge, & McConnell, 2008) was developed based on the work of Baumgarten-Tramer 
(1938) to measure children’s gratitude and has been previously utilized in a written 
format.  The original measure contains four questions: “What is your greatest wish?  
What would you do for the person who granted you that wish?  Is there anything else you 
would do for this person?  Who is this person?”   
As this study was completed online and with a different population (college 
students as opposed to children), a modified version of the WAGS was developed.  In 
this study the participants were asked to type open-ended responses to the following three 
questions: “What is your greatest wish? Why is this your greatest wish? What would you 
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do for the person who granted you this wish?”  The responses to the third question were 
then coded according to the type of gratitude expressed and in cases in which participants 
expressed different types of gratitude (e.g., verbal and concrete, verbal and connective, 
etc.) each type was coded. 
In the final analyses, participants were categorized into eight groups: (a) no 
gratitude expressed or “don’t know,” (b) verbal gratitude, (b) concrete gratitude, (c) 
verbal & concrete gratitude, (d) connective gratitude, (e) self-sufficient, (f) finalistic 
gratitude, and (g) other.  As discussed previously, Tudge and Freitas’ (2018) 
conceptualization of gratitude is not hierarchical, although connective gratitude is 
considered to be closest to gratitude as a moral virtue.  Categorizing participants’ 
responses into the eight categories was completed to match this theoretical underpinning; 
participants who used connective gratitude at all were categorized as (d) connective 
gratitude, regardless of their expression of other types of gratitude.  Participants who 
expressed verbal and/or concrete gratitude (but not connective gratitude) were 
categorized into verbal gratitude, concrete gratitude, and a third category 
(verbal/concrete) for those who expressed both (e.g., “I’d thank them from the bottom of 
my heart and give them a million dollars”).  Logistic regressions were conducted, with 
each gratitude type dummy coded (1 = expressed; 0 = not expressed).  
The second question (“Why is this your greatest wish?”) was added to gain 
greater insight into the meaning of the wish, which in cases of uncertainty on the part of 
the coder can help inform the coding of the final question.   
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Vignette.  To measure moral obligation in the tradition of Piaget (1932/1965), a 
vignette (Freitas, 2007) was modified to be used in a written (as opposed to interview) 
format.  The vignette described an everyday example of a situation in which the 
protagonist of the story may feel a moral obligation to someone else.  The vignette used 
in this study was modified to the following: 
Sam had a dog, and one afternoon the dog disappeared.  Aunt Anne, who was 
visiting from out of town, was making dinner that night.  Sam said, “Aunt Anne, 
can you help me find my dog?”  Aunt Anne stopped what she was doing and said, 
“No problem. I’ll help you find your dog, Sam.”  They spent a lot of time looking 
for the lost dog.  When it was almost dark, they found him.  Aunt Anne had to 
throw away dinner and start everything again. 
This vignette was presented to the participants twice—once in an open-ended 
format and second in a check-list format.  The open-ended version asked the respondents 
to think about the story and write responses to the following questions: (1) “How did Sam 
feel?  Provide as much detail as you can.” (2) “Why did Sam feel that way?” (3) “Did 
Sam feel anything about Aunt Anne?  Provide as much detail as you can.” (4) “Should 
Sam help Aunt Anne make another dinner?  Why or why not?”  
The checklist version asked similar questions, but instead of allowing open-ended 
responses, provided a list of possible responses for participants to select.  In this study, 
only answers to the final question (“Should Sam help Aunt Anne make another 
dinner?  Check just the most important one.”) were coded.  Participants could select from 
seven possible answers: (1) Yes, because otherwise Aunt Anne will be mad; (2) No, 
there’s no reason to help; (3) Yes, because Sam feels that it’s the good thing to do; (4) 
No, it was her decision to stop making dinner; (5) Yes, because the rule is to help those 
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who have helped us; (6) No, Sam isn’t able to help make dinner; (7) Yes, because 
otherwise Aunt Anne will think Sam’s not a very nice person.  These options were coded 
as showing autonomous moral obligation (3), heteronomous moral obligation (1, 5, 7), or 
no obligation (2, 4, 6).   
Logistic regressions were conducted using dummy variables of the moral 
obligation type categorical variable.  For analyses in which autonomous obligation (1 = 
autonomous, 0 = heteronomous or “no obligation”) was the dependent variable, all cases 
(including both heteronomous obligation and “no obligation” expressed) were included.  
For analyses in which heteronomous obligation was the dependent variable (1 = 
heteronomous, 0 = autonomous), “no obligation” cases were excluded as the comparison 
between autonomous and heteronomous obligation was the question of interest.  
GQ-6.  The 6-item Gratitude Questionnaire (McCullough et al., 2002) was used 
as a comparison measure to the WAGS, based on the theoretical critique that the GQ-6 
does not measure gratitude but instead measures appreciation (Navarro & Morris, 2018; 
Tudge et al., 2015).  This 6-item measure (see Appendix B) contains items such as “I 
have so much in life to be thankful for” and “When I look at the world, I don’t see much 
to be grateful for” and was scored on a Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly disagree to 
7 = Strongly agree.  After taking into account the reverse-coded items (items 3 and 6), 
these scores were then added to create a total GQ-6 score.  
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Analysis 
 I first examined whether relevant demographic variables (e.g., gender, belief in 
God) were significantly related to the variables of interest.  They were not, and therefore 
were not included in subsequent analyses.  
Binary logistic regression analyses were used to test all hypotheses except 2.3.  
For hypothesis 1.1, a dichotomous outcome variable was created from the type of 
gratitude expressed; participants either expressed or did not express connective gratitude, 
the type that is closest to gratitude as a virtue.  Similarly, for hypothesis 1.2, a 
dichotomous outcome variable was created for whether or not autonomous moral 
obligation was expressed.  Religious interpretation, the independent variable for these 
two hypotheses, was treated as a continuous variable, with higher scores indicating a 
more symbolic approach to the interpretation of religion.  
 Binary logistic regression analyses were also used to test whether moral 
obligation moderated relations between moral obligation and the type of gratitude 
expressed.  Hypothesis 1.3 was tested to see whether autonomous moral obligation 
moderated relations between religious interpretation and connective gratitude, such that 
relations between scores of religious interpretation and connective gratitude would be 
stronger for people who expressed autonomous moral obligation.  Connective gratitude, 
the dependent variable in this model, was again treated as a dichotomous variable; 
participants expressed or did not express connective gratitude on the WAGS.  
Autonomous moral obligation was also treated dichotomously; participants either 
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expressed this form of moral obligation or did not.  Religious interpretation was a 
continuous variable.   
Hypothesis 1.4 was tested to see whether heteronomous moral obligation 
moderated relations between religious interpretation and the expression of verbal, 
concrete, and verbal/concrete gratitude, such that relations between scores of religious 
interpretation and non-connective forms of gratitude would be stronger for people who 
expressed heteronomous moral obligation.  Heteronomous moral obligation was also 
treated dichotomously, and religious interpretation was again treated as a continuous 
variable.   
 Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 were also examined using binary logistic regression.  The 
independent variable for both hypotheses—the degree of transcendence (i.e., the belief in 
God or a higher power)—was a continuous variable, with higher scores indicating a 
greater belief in a transcendent reality.  For hypothesis 2.1, autonomous and 
heteronomous moral obligation (the dependent variables) were dichotomous (i.e., 
participants either expressed or did not express autonomous or heteronomous moral 
obligation).  Similarly, hypothesis 2.2 examined the relations between belief in a 
transcendent reality and verbal, concrete, verbal/concrete, and connective gratitude.  All 
types of gratitude were treated as dichotomous dependent variables.  As the dependent 
variable in hypothesis 2.3 was continuous, a simple linear regression analysis was 
utilized.  
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CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
Preliminary Findings 
All analyses were performed using SPSS Version 25.0.  Connective gratitude was 
the most frequently expressed form of gratitude (39.4%) (i.e., connective gratitude 
expressed solely and connective gratitude expressed in conjunction with other forms of 
gratitude; see Table 4 for a full breakdown of the typologies of connective gratitude), but 
many respondents also expressed concrete (9.9%), verbal (19.9%), or a combination of 
verbal and concrete (8.5%) gratitude.  Similarly, the majority of respondents (52.2%) 
expressed autonomous moral obligation (unsurprising given the age of the sample), but 
many also expressed heteronomous obligation (30.7%).  
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Table 4 
Frequency of Gratitude and Moral Obligation Types 
Variables (N = 648) 
 
         #       % 
Gratitude Types  
No gratitude expressed 18  (  2.8) 
Verbal 129  (19.9) 
Concrete 64  (  9.9) 
Verbal & Concrete 55  (  8.5) 
Connective 255  (39.4) 
Connective only 199  (30.7) 
Connective & Verbal 48  (  7.4) 
Connective & Concrete 3  (  0.5) 
Connective, Concrete & Verbal  4  (  0.6) 
Connective & Self-sufficient  1  (  0.2) 
Finalistic 8  (  1.2) 
Self-sufficient 42  (  6.5) 
Other 18  (  2.8) 
Missing 59  (  9.1) 
Obligation Types   
      No obligation expressed 31  (  4.8) 
      Heteronomous obligation 199  (30.7) 
      Autonomous obligation 338  (52.2) 
Missing 80  (12.3) 
PCBS Score  
Interpretation        19.1 (15.1)* 
Transcendence       10.0  (20.0)* 
 
Note. *Means (Standard Deviation) 
The PCBS scores for interpretation and transcendence are displayed orthogonally 
in Figure 6.  This figure illustrates the distribution of PCBS scores across all four 
quadrants of Wolff’s religious attitudes.  Most scores fell in quadrants II (second naivëte) 
and III (relativism).  Relatively few respondents fell into quadrants I (orthodoxy) or IV 
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(external critique).  This distribution supports the use of the PCBS as two continuous 
variables, as compared to a categorical variable (quadrant I, II, III, or IV).  
Figure 6 
Graph of PCBS Scores  
 
 
 
The Relation between Religiosity and Expression of Gratitude or Moral Obligation 
 Interpretation of religion.  Binary logistic regression was used to test hypotheses 
1.1 and 1.2 to determine whether religious interpretation could predict connective 
gratitude or autonomous obligation; results are summarized in Table 5 and visually 
represented in Figure 7.  Hypothesis 1.1 was not supported, indicating that in this study 
religious processing was not a statistically significant predictor of connective gratitude.  
However, results for hypothesis 1.2 were significant; religious interpretation was 
significantly related to autonomous moral obligation (𝛽 = 0.011, 𝑒# = 1.012, 𝑝 =
	0.045).  That is, with each additional one point increase in religious interpretation 
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(indicating a more symbolic approach), participants were 1.012 more likely to express 
autonomous moral obligation.  
Binary logistic regression analyses were also used to test whether moral 
obligation moderated relations between religious interpretation and the type of gratitude 
expressed.  All interaction hypotheses (1.3, 1.4a, 1.4b, 1.4c) were non-significant, 
indicating that in this study moral obligation did not moderate relations between 
interpretation and gratitude type.  
Table 5 
Logistic Regression Analyses of Models 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 
 
Model Predictor Variable Outcome Variable 𝛽 Wald test p 𝑒# 
1.1 Religious 
interpretation 
 
Connective 
gratitude 
.005 .865 .352 1.005 
1.2 Religious 
interpretation 
 
Autonomous moral 
obligation 
.011 4.025 .045 1.012 
1.3 Religious 
interpretation x 
Autonomous 
moral obligation 
 
Connective 
gratitude 
.007 1.576 .209 1.007 
1.4a Religious 
interpretation x 
heteronomous 
moral obligation 
 
Verbal gratitude .002 .035 .851 1.002 
1.4b Religious 
interpretation x 
heteronomous 
moral obligation 
 
Concrete gratitude .008 .550 .458 1.008 
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1.4c Religious 
interpretation x 
heteronomous 
moral obligation 
 
Verbal & concrete 
gratitude 
.006 .259 .611 6 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
Interpretation of Religion Model with Results 
 
 
Transcendence.  Binary logistic regression was also used to test hypotheses 2.1, 
and 2.2; results are summarized in Table 6.  As hypothesized, the degree of 
transcendence was not a significant predictor of autonomous moral obligation, 
heteronomous moral obligation, or the type of gratitude expressed. A power analysis 
(power = .999) revealed compelling evidence that the lack of significant relations 
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between transcendence and (a) the two types of moral obligation and (g) the four types of 
gratitude could not be attributed to an insufficiency of participants. 
Table 6 
 
Binary Logistic Regression Analyses of Models 2.1, 2.2 
Model Predictor Variable Outcome Variable 𝛽 Wald test p 𝑒# 
2.1a Transcendence 
 
Autonomous moral 
obligation 
 
-.003 .479 .489 .997 
2.1b Transcendence 
 
Heteronomous 
moral obligation 
.003 .588 .443 1.002 
2.2a Transcendence Verbal gratitude .004 .643 .423 1.004 
2.2b Transcendence Concrete gratitude -.007 1.206 .272 .993 
2.2c Transcendence Verbal & concrete 
gratitude 
-.004 .289 .591 .996 
2.2d Transcendence Connective 
gratitude 
-.001 .073 .787 .999 
For hypothesis 2.3, a simple linear regression was calculated to predict GQ-6 
scores based on degree of transcendence.  A significant regression equation was found 
(F[1, 570] = 65.585, p < .001), with an adjusted R2 of .102.  Participants’ GQ-6 scores 
increased .077 points for every point increase in degree of transcendence.  Results are 
reported in Table 7 and displayed in Figure 8. 
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Table 7 
 
Linear Regression of Model 2.3  (Transcendence predicting GQ-6 scores) 
Variable B SE 95% CI 𝛽 t p 
(Constant) 36.095 .214 (35.674, 36.516)  168.503 .000 
Transcendence  .077 .010 (.059, .096) .321 8.068 .000 
Note. R2 adjusted = .103 
 
Figure 8 
Transcendence Model with Results 
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
/Gratitude/ and religiosity have been the focus of numerous studies (e.g., Al-
Sehell & Noor, 2016; Hardy et al., 2014; Kraus et al., 2015; Lambert et al., 2009; Li & 
Chow, 105; Rosmarin et al., 2011; Tsang & Martin, 2016), but this literature is plagued 
by conceptual and methodological inconsistencies.  One of the key concerns is that both 
/gratitude/ and religiosity are defined and measured differently in each study, making 
generalizations difficult.  In response to these inconsistencies and confusion, I examined 
the relations between gratitude and religiosity by clearly defining both constructs, and 
using measures appropriate to each.  Further, I included moral obligation as a variable in 
this study because it serves as a theoretical buttress to connective gratitude; obligation 
may help to explain why people express different types of gratitude.  
Overall, the findings presented here suggest that gratitude, moral obligation, and 
religiosity are not related.  These null findings are not a disappointment; in fact, these 
null findings (with considerable power) contradict most of the existing literature on 
gratitude and religiosity and serve to underscore the conceptual and operational problems 
in this field of research.  
Moral Obligation  
 Moral obligation differentiates two forms of moral reasoning (i.e., heteronomous 
and autonomous moral reasoning) and helps to explain why people make the decisions
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they do.  People who use heteronomous moral reasoning make decisions based on norms 
and rules established by others, whereas people use autonomous moral reasoning base 
their decisions on cooperatively created rules and norms (Piaget, 1932/1965).  Moral 
obligation describes the motivation behind decision-making: Are decisions motivated by 
an external (heteronomous) or internal (autonomous) sense of duty or obligation?  In this 
study, moral obligation was measured using a vignette about a situation in which one 
person (a benefactor) does a kind deed for another (a beneficiary); subsequent questions 
assessed how and why the participants felt the beneficiary should respond to the 
benefactor.  
Moral obligation was included as a variable in this study because I hypothesized 
that it might help to serve as a mechanism to explain relations between religiosity and 
gratitude.  Although no associations were found between either dimension of religiosity 
and gratitude, this analysis of moral obligation does present interesting points for 
discussion.  As discussed in the results, autonomous moral obligation was positively 
associated with how religious content is processed (interpretation) but neither 
autonomous nor heteronomous moral obligation were associated with belief in God or a 
higher power (transcendence).  These results corroborate previous studies examining 
religiosity and moral reasoning (e.g., Duriez & Soenens, 2006; Getz, 1984; Sapp & 
Jones, 1986).   
Interpretation.  In this study, how people process religion (measured by the 
interpretation axis of the PCBS) significantly predicted the expression of autonomous 
moral obligation.  In short, participants who processed religion more symbolically were 
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more likely to use autonomous moral reasoning.  This finding supports the results of 
previous studies that have looked at how people think about religious content and moral 
reasoning.  
For example, Duriez and Soenens (2006) found that participants who scored 
higher in symbolic interpretation (using the same PCBS measure as used in this study) 
were more likely to display higher stages of moral reasoning (using Kohlberg’s Moral 
Judgement Test).  In addition, previous studies have also found positive associations 
between moral reasoning and Batson’s quest dimension of religiosity.  The quest 
dimension, defined as an “openness, flexibility, and a willingness to deal with existential 
questions” (Sapp & Jones, 1986, p. 212), parallels Wulff’s interpretation dimension as 
both examine how people “deal” with questions beyond reality.  Both Glover (1997) and 
Duriez and Soenens (2006) found positive correlations with the quest dimension and 
higher stages of moral reasoning. 
When looking at both previous results and the current findings, it is clear that how 
people process religious content is related to how they reason about moral decisions; 
those who interpret religion more symbolically are also more likely to make decisions 
based on their own moral compass.  Future research should examine this association 
further to determine if these two processes are causally related to one another and/or to 
other variables that may impact both (e.g., education, cognitive development, parenting 
style, perceptions of self, context, etc.).  
Transcendence.  Wulff (1991) defined the transcendence axis of his schema as 
“…the degree to which the objects of religious interest are explicitly granted participation 
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in a transcendent reality or, to the contrary, are limited to processes immanent within the 
mundane world” (p. 630).  This dimension is similar to Allport’s intrinsic dimension of 
religiosity, which is defined as “as a meaning-endowing framework in terms of which all 
life is understood” (Donahue, 1985, p. 400).  Both of these dimensions examine the 
extent to which people have an authentic and internal belief in God, and as such, 
comparisons can be made between the religious transcendence dimension used in this 
study and previous studies using Allport’s framework.  
Kohlberg and Power (1981) argued that moral development and faith 
development are independent; they believed that moral development was tied to cognitive 
development, justice, and context, not religious belief.  Previous research using Allport’s 
approach (e.g., Getz, 1984; Glover, 1997; Sapp & Jones, 1986) to measuring religiosity, 
as well as previous research using the PCBS (e.g. Duriez & Soenens, 2006), found no 
correlations between moral reasoning and a belief in God.  The results of the current 
study support both theory and prior research; no significant associations were found 
between the transcendent dimension of Wulff’s schema of religious attitudes and either 
autonomous or heteronomous moral reasoning.  
Gratitude 
While social scientists define /gratitude/ in a multitude of ways (e.g., as an 
emotion, trait, disposition, etc.), the current study conceptualized gratitude as a virtue 
(Tudge & Freitas, 2018).  Based upon the work of Aristotle (1985), Annas (2011), and 
Baumgarten-Tramer (1938), Tudge and Freitas conceived of gratitude as more than a 
fleeting emotion or sense of appreciation; they assert that virtuous gratitude is a 
   
62 
disposition that can be cultivated across the life course.  Tudge and Freitas posited that 
connective gratitude comes closest to gratitude as a virtue.  In their model, connective 
gratitude is expressed to a benefactor rather than for a benefit and the beneficiary should 
freely wish to repay the benefactor.  Tudge and Freitas also described other types of 
gratitude, including verbal (e.g., “Thank you”) and concrete (i.e., self-oriented reciprocal 
behavior).  /Gratitude/, defined as a disposition to appreciate the good things in life and 
measured as a continuous variable with the GQ-6 in this study, was also included to 
examine any differences between these two constructs of gratitude and their relations to 
religiosity.  The current study did not find any relations between either dimension of 
religiosity and any type of gratitude but did find a highly significant association between 
transcendence and /gratitude/.  
Interpretation.  My hypotheses about gratitude and the interpretation of religion 
were not supported; there were no significant associations found between interpretation 
and any type of gratitude (i.e., verbal, concrete, verbal/concrete, or connective gratitude), 
even when moral obligation was added to the model as a moderator.  
I initially hypothesized that connective gratitude would relate to how religion is 
interpreted because people who use connective gratitude should be able to: (a) take the 
perspective of the benefactor, and (b) freely choose to repay the benefactor (i.e., use of 
autonomous moral reasoning).  The first component was supported by Duriez (2004), 
who found a positive association between the symbolic interpretation of religious content 
and the ability to perspective take.  The second component was supported both by 
previous research (e.g., Duriez, 2006; Glover, 1997) and by the current study, all of 
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which found significant associations between symbolic processing and autonomous 
moral reasoning.  However, gratitude was not related to the interpretation of religion in 
this study.  Further, moral obligation did not moderate relations between scores of 
religious interpretation and the expression of any type of gratitude.  
Transcendence.  As hypothesized, transcendence (i.e., the belief in God or a 
higher power) was not related to the expression of any type of gratitude.  This mirrors the 
current study’s null findings related to moral obligation—transcendence was predictive of 
neither.  The results of this study suggest that the level of religious belief is not related to 
how people reason through moral situations or how they express gratitude to other 
people.   
However, in the current study, belief in God or a higher power (transcendence) 
was positively related to /gratitude/, as measured by the GQ-6.  This association has also 
been found by other researchers looking at religiosity and /gratitude/ (e.g., Kraus et al., 
2015; Li & Chow, 2015; Tsang et al., 2013).  Li and Chow (2015) found that highly 
religious teens had higher scores of /gratitude/, which they defined as a disposition and 
measured using the GQ-6.  Kraus et al. (2015) also found a positive relation between 
religious efficacy and gratitude, which they defined as an emotion.  Tsang et al. (2013) 
found a strong association between Allport’s intrinsic religiosity subscale and /gratitude/, 
which they defined as an emotion and measured with the GQ-6.  Although they found a 
strong association between religiosity and /gratitude/, Tsang et al. (2013) found no 
significant association between religiosity and grateful behavior.  These findings closely 
mirror those of the current study; those who scored higher in transcendence scored higher 
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on the GQ-6, but those who scored higher in transcendence were not more likely to 
express connective gratitude.  Although the WAGS does not measure behavior itself, it 
does ask how someone might respond to a benefactor, including using reciprocal 
behaviors (i.e., connective gratitude).    
Clearly there is a strong relation between the extent to which people believe in 
God or a higher power and /gratitude/, especially /gratitude/ measured using the GQ-6.  
And yet there is little evidence to suggest that belief in God is related to virtuous 
gratitude.  This raises the questions: How can people be both /grateful/ and ungrateful at 
the same time?  What is /gratitude/? 
Tudge (2018) argued that ingratitude is the key to solving this conundrum.  In his 
example, person A is given a lift home by person B.  Person A said: “Thank you! I am so 
grateful to you for the ride.”  The next week person A is driving to work and sees person 
B stranded by the side of the road but person A drives by without stopping.  On the GQ-6 
(which measures gratitude for things and contains items like “I have so much in life to be 
thankful for”), person A might score high and be considered to be /grateful/.  And yet 
person A is clearly ungrateful; failing to stop and help person B is a marker of ingratitude 
for the kind deed provided the previous week.  However, if we conceive of the GQ-6 as 
measuring a different construct (e.g., appreciation), the situation does not seem as 
incongruous.  For example, people who do not express their appreciation for their good 
fortune or a marvelous sunset would not be labelled “ungrateful.”  Ingratitude seems to 
be entirely related to a failure to reciprocate to a benefactor.  
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The results of this study are further evidence to support the arguments of scholars 
(e.g., Gulliford et al., 2013; Navarro & Morris, 2018; Tudge et al., 2015; Tudge & 
Freitas, 2018) who have suggested that conceptual and methodological difficulties exist 
in the field of gratitude research.  Simply, /gratitude/ is not gratitude, but a separate 
construct entirely.  
Although the GQ-6 may be measuring a related construct like appreciation, it may 
also be tapping into a religious construct.  As suggested by Tsang and Martin (2016) and 
Lambert et al. (2009), GQ-6 scores may be higher among people with a strong faith in 
God because religious activities (e.g., prayer, religious services, reading holy scripture, 
etc.) offer daily opportunities for the development of a form of religious /gratitude/ or 
religious appreciation.  This calls into question the validity of previous studies looking at 
relations between /gratitude/ and various other factors (e.g., pro-social behaviors, 
reductions in anxiety, stronger social connections, etc.).  Perhaps previous positive 
findings between /gratitude/ and these variables are due in part to the religiosity of the 
sample, not gratitude itself.  Future researchers should control for transcendence (or 
intrinsic religiosity) when using the GQ-6 to see how religiosity may influence their 
results.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
While the results of this study pose numerous interesting questions for future 
research, the study suffers from several limitations with regards to the sample, the study 
design, and the measures used.  
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The sample for this study was recruited from large undergraduate lecture classes 
in a department of Human Development and Family Studies in the southeastern United 
States.  Classes in this department are predominately female, and the sample of this study 
reflects that trend—the sample was over ninety percent (92.7%) female.  In addition, the 
sample was comprised largely of young adults (92.6% were between the ages of 18-22), 
of self-identified Christians (80.3%), and of people pursuing a college degree.  Clearly, 
this sample is unique and not representative of the general population.  As a result, these 
findings may have little generalizability to other groups.  Previous research examining 
/gratitude/ and religiosity is also largely comprised of similar samples: Christian college 
students in the United States (Tsang & Martin, 2016).  This sample homogeneity is a flaw 
not only with the current study, but also the field as a whole.  Future research should be 
completed with more heterogenous populations to ascertain how these two constructs 
relate to one another in different contexts.   
Similarly to previous studies looking at gratitude and religiosity (e.g., Duriez & 
Soenens, 2006; Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Hardy et al., 2014; Kraus et al., 2015; Li & Chow, 
2015; Rosmarin et al., 2011), the current study was cross-sectional and little can be 
inferred about any causal relationships between the two constructs.  Longitudinal 
research should be completed to examine how gratitude and religiosity interact across the 
life course: Does religiosity impact how gratitude develops?  Does gratitude impact how 
religiosity develops?  Do changes in religious belief, involvement or affiliation impact 
how gratitude is expressed?  
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 In addition, the current study used self-report measures of both religiosity and 
gratitude.  This overreliance on self-report measures is a limitation as participants may 
have exaggerated to seem “good” when asked questions about prosocial attitudes and 
behaviors (i.e., social desirability).  This limitation has been noted in other studies of 
religiosity and gratitude (e.g., Lambert et al., 2009; Li & Chow, 2015; Tsang et al., 2012).  
In addition to concerns of social desirability, the self-report measures used in this study 
only assessed participants’ perceptions of their values and behaviors, not their actual 
behaviors.  Intending to do something and actually doing something are very different.  
As Gertrude Stein wrote: “Silent gratitude isn’t very much use to anyone.” 
Conclusion  
While null findings are often seen as a failure in social science research, I believe 
they simply offer a different perspective.  I hope this study will make a number of 
contributions to the literature.  First, to my knowledge, this is the first study to examine 
gratitude as a virtue and religiosity, and the first study to use the PCBS measure of 
religiosity in the United States.  Second, this study both confirms previous moral 
reasoning research (i.e., autonomous moral obligation was related to the symbolic 
processing of religion and neither autonomous nor heteronomous moral obligation were 
related to the degree of transcendence) and contradicts previous /gratitude/ research (i.e., 
gratitude as a virtue was not related to either dimension of religiosity).  Third, the results 
of this study highlight the need for clarity in the field of gratitude research.  I found null 
findings related to gratitude and religiosity, but highly significant findings between 
/gratitude/ and religiosity.  Clearly the incongruency between these results suggests that 
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they are separate constructs and should not both be labelled as gratitude.  For this field of 
research to become stronger, future gratitude researchers should not vaguely or 
inconsistently define gratitude.  Gratitude should be clearly conceptualized and 
operationalized accordingly.  Further, researchers must also take similar caution when 
examining religiosity, and look beyond outdated methods of measurement.  For research 
to contribute to a greater understanding of how gratitude and religiosity relate to one 
another we must compare apples to apples. 
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APPENDIX A 
WISHES AND GRATITUDE SURVEY  
(WAGS: FREITAS, TUDGE & MCCONNELL, 2008) 
1. What is your greatest wish? 
2. Why is this your greatest wish? 
3. What would you do for the person who granted you this wish? 
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APPENDIX B 
GRATITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE 6-ITEM FORM 
(GQ-6: MCCULLOUGH ET AL., 2002) 
 
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how 
much you agree with it.  
 
1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = slightly disagree; 4 = neutral; 5 = slightly agree; 6 
= agree; 7 = strongly agree  
 
____1. I have so much in life to be thankful for.  
____2. If I had to list everything that I felt grateful for, it would be a very long list.  
____3. When I look at the world, I don’t see much to be grateful for.* 
____4. I am grateful to a wide variety of people.  
____5. As I get older I find myself more able to appreciate the people, events, and 
situations that have been part of my life history.  
____6. Long amounts of time can go by before I feel grateful to something or someone.* 
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APPENDIX C 
VIGNETTE  
(FREITAS, 2007) 
Sam had a dog, and one afternoon the dog disappeared. Aunt Anne, who was visiting 
from out of town, was making dinner that night. Sam said, “Aunt Anne, can you help me 
find my dog?” Aunt Anne stopped what she was doing and said, “No problem. I’ll help 
you find your dog, Sam.” They spent a lot of time looking for the lost dog. When it was 
almost dark, they found him. Aunt Anne had to throw away dinner and start everything 
again. 
 
1. How did Sam feel?  Provide as much detail as you can: 
2. Why did Sam feel that way? 
3. Did Sam feel anything about Aunt Anne? Provide as much detail as you can:  
4. Should Sam help Aunt Anne make another dinner?  Why or why not?  
5. If Sam doesn’t help Aunt Anne, is there a problem?  If so, what’s the problem?  If 
it’s not a problem, why not? 
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APPENDIX D 
VIGNETTE CHECKLIST VERSION 
(FREITAS, 2007) 
Sam had a dog, and one afternoon the dog disappeared.  Aunt Anne, who was visiting 
from out of town, was making dinner that night.  Sam said, “Aunt Anne, can you help me 
find my dog?” Aunt Anne stopped what she was doing and said, “No problem. I’ll help 
you find your dog, Sam.”  They spent a lot of time looking for the lost dog.  When it was 
almost dark, they found him.  Aunt Anne had to throw away dinner and start everything 
again.  
 
How did Sam feel?  
(you can check with an X more than one if you want, but put XX by the answer you think 
was Sam’s MAIN feeling)   
___Sad, because the dog had been lost. 
___Happy, because the dog was found. 
___Sad, because dinner was ruined. 
___Happy, because Aunt Anne helped find the dog. 
 
Did Sam feel anything about Aunt Anne? 
(you can check with an X more than one if you want, but put XX by the answer you think 
was Sam’s MAIN feeling)   
___No, Sam was just happy about finding the dog. 
___No, Sam was just sad about losing the dog. 
___Yes, Sam was happy to have such a nice Aunt. 
___Yes, Sam was sad that dinner was ruined. 
___Yes, Sam was happy about the fact that she helped find the dog. 
___Yes, Sam was sad that she had spent so much time helping to find the dog. 
 
Should Sam help Aunt Anne make another dinner?  
(you can check with an X more than one if you want, but put XX by the answer you think 
was Sam’s MAIN feeling)   
___Yes, because otherwise Aunt Anne will be mad. 
___No, there’s no reason to help. 
___Yes, because Sam feels that it’s the good thing to do. 
___No, it was her decision to stop making dinner. 
___Yes, because the rule is to help those who have helped us. 
___No, Sam isn’t able to help make dinner. 
___Yes, because otherwise Aunt Anne will think Sam’s not a very nice person. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
POST-CRITICAL BELIEF SCALE  
(PCBS: DURIEZ & HUSTEBAUT, 2002) 
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